We propose a new cryptographic task, which we call verifiable quantum secure modulo summation. Secure modulo summation is a calculation of modulo summation Y 1 + . . . + Y m when m players have their individual variables Y 1 , . . . , Y m with keeping the secrecy of the individual variables. However, the conventional method for secure modulo summation uses so many secret communication channels. We say that a quantum protocol for secure modulo summation is quantum verifiable secure modulo summation when it can verify the desired secrecy condition. If we combine device independent quantum key distribution, it is possible to verify such secret communication channels. However, it consumes so many steps. To resolve this problem, using quantum systems, we propose a more direct method to realize secure modulo summation with verification. To realize this protocol, we propose modulo zero-sum randomness as another new concept, and show that secure modulo summation can be realized by using modulo zero-sum randomness. Then, we construct a verifiable quantum protocol method to generate modulo zero-sum randomness. This protocol can be verified only with minimum requirements.
relation m i=1 X i = 0 holds and any m − 1 variables among X 1 , . . . , X m are independent of each other. Player i has the randomness X i and does not know any other random variables except for the above zero-sum condition. The secure modulo zero-sum randomness is a kind of correlated randomness. Once m players share secure modulo zero-sum randomness, using broadcast public channel, i.e., a special channel that cannot be altered nor blocked and can be broadcast to all players, the m players can realize secure modulo summation.
The big advantage of use of quantum system is selftesting. Selftesting offers the verification of quantum measurement and states only with the minimum assumption [5] , [6] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . That is, we do not need to trust any quantum device, and it is sufficient to assume the independence among several measurement devices. We propose a quantum protocol to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness as follows. First, the m players share the GHZ state with respect to the phase basis. Then, they measure their own system with computation basis. Since the GHZ state can be regarded as a two-colorable graph state, it can be verified by selftesting [13] , [16] , [17] . However, all players need to verify it without trusting other players only with the minimum non-collusion condition. Due to this requirement, we cannot directly apply the existing methods for selftesting of the GHZ state because they did not care the minimum non-collusion condition. In this paper, we propose a new selftesting protocol to verify the GHZ state under the minimum non-collusion condition. This protocol is designed so that each player can verify a certain secrecy criterion of the generated GHZ state when m − 2 remaining players collude at most. Combining them, we can realize a quantum protocol for secure modulo summation with verification.
B. Application of secure modulo zero-sum randomness
Although secure modulo zero-sum randomness realizes secure modulo summation in the above way and secure modulo summation can be applied to visual secret sharing [3] , [4] , secure modulo zero-sum randomness has many other useful applications as follows. These applications show usefulness of our verifiable quantum protocol to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
• Application to secret sharing: In the standard setting of multi-party secure computation, many cryptographic protocols require secure communication channels between any distinct two players [18] , [19] . For example, secure multi-party computation for homomorphic functions can be realized without honest majority, but it requires so many secure communication channels [1] . Also, any existing secret sharing protocol requires many secure communication channels [20] , [22] , [26] , [24] , [23] , [25] , [21] , [27] . In this paper, using the secure modulo zero-sum randomness, we propose protocols to realize these tasks without secure communication channels (but broadcast public channel). That is, based on secure modulo zero-sum randomness, we construct a protocol for multi-party secure computation for some additively homomorphic functions without honest majority nor secure communication channels. Also, based on the secure modulo zero-sum randomness, we construct secret sharing protocols without secure communication channels. We first give a basic protocol for secret sharing without secure communication channels. Then, by utilizing universal hash functions, we adapt the basic protocol to a cheater detectable protocol without secure communication channels. • Application to securely computing additively homomorphic functions: A standard method for multi-party secure computation requires honest majority or secure communication channels. Another method based on secure message transmission [28] , [29] , [30] , [31] realizes multi-party secure computation without honest majority nor secure communication channels. Instead of secure communication channel, we can employ secure message transmission, which is a cryptographic protocol between two parties, between which there are several channels but some of them are corrupted, to send messages privately and reliably. Secure message transmission protocols can simulate a secure communication channel between the two parties. In the standard setting of perfectly secure message transmission, honest majority over the channels is required. If the broadcast public channel is available in secure message transmission, then such a barrier can be overcome [32] , [33] , [34] and multi-party secure computation can be realized by using secure message transmission with the broadcast public channel [35] . However, the respective simulations of the secure communication channels are quite inefficient.
To resolve this problem, based on the secure modulo zero-sum randomness, this paper proposes an alternative method for securely computing additively homomorphic functions. Our protocol uses only broadcast public channel as well as the secure modulo zero-sum randomness. • Application to multi-party anonymous authentication: As another application, we propose multi-party anonymous authentication, which is a new cryptographic task. Consider the case when a certain project requires the approvals from all the players. We are required to verify that all the players approve the project by confirming the contents of the project. Additionally, we might require the anonymity for this approval due to the following reason. This is because if a person disagreeing to the project can be identified, a player might hesitate to disagree to it even when he/she does not agree on it in his/her mind. In this paper, using secure modulo zero-sum randomness, we construct a protocol to realize multi-party anonymous authentication without secure communication channel. Indeed, secure modulo zero-sum randomness can be generated by multi-party secure computation for modulo sum. In this sense, the generation of secure modulo zero-sum randomness can be regarded as an equivalent task to multi-party secure computation for modulo sum. In addition, we also discuss several methods to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
C. Organization of this paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section II defines a new cryptographic resource modulo zero-sum randomness and discusses the equivalence to related secure computation protocols. Section III shows that if we are allowed to use quantum algorithms it is possible to verify that the resource satisfies the property of secure modulo zero-sum randomness. By combining the results in Sections II and III, Section IV proposes a quantum verifiable protocol for secure modulo summation. Section V compares our method with other methods. Section VI extends the results in Section II to secure computation with respect to additively homomorphic functions. Section VII provides secret sharing protocols without secure communication channels. Section VIII proposes a new cryptographic task multiparty anonymous authentication, which employs modulo zero-sum randomness. Appendix C gives the generalization to the case with a general finite filed F q when we trust our measurement devices.
II. SECURE MODULO ZERO-SUM RANDOMNESS
First, we give the rigorous definition of secure modulo zero-sum randomness for the random numbers X i ∈ F c 2 with i = 1, . . . , m. The random numbers X i ∈ F c 2 with i = 1, . . . , m is called secure modulo zero-sum randomness when the following conditions hold.
(1) Modulo zero condition:
Independence condition: Any m − 1 variables among X 1 , . . . , X m are independent of each other and subject to the uniform distribution.
(3)
Secrecy condition: Player i has the randomness X i and does not know any other random variables except for the modulo zero condition. Let W i be the information of Player i except for X i . Then, the relation I(X 1 , . . . , X m ; X i W i ) = I(X 1 , . . . , X m ; X i ) holds. Using modulo zero-sum randomness, we can realize the secure calculation of the modulo sum Y 1 + · · · + Y m as a function with m inputs Y i ∈ F c 2 without revealing the information for respective inputs. Here, the m inputs are given by m different players, and it is required to calculate the output without informing their inputs to other players. It is known that secure multi-party computation for modulo sum is possible without honest majority [1] . That is, even when the majority of players do not behave honestly, the secrecy of each input can be guaranteed. However, it requires secure communication channels. When no secure communication channel is available, to realize the above task only with broadcast public channels, it is natural to employ cryptographic resources. Now let us define the task of secure modulo summation when player j has the secret input Y j ∈ F c 2 for j = 1, . . . , m.
(1) Reliability condition: Any player i must calculate the modulo sum Y 1 + · · · + Y m when all players are honest. (2) Secrecy condition: Assume that m − 2 players except for Player j collude at most, which is called the minimum non-collusion condition. Also, their variables Y 1 , . . . , Y m are assumed to be independent of each other and subject to the uniform distribution. Then, the variable X j of player j is independent of the information Z obtained by the m − 2 colluded players. That is, the relation I(X j ; Z) = 0 holds. Indeed, when secure modulo zero-sum randomness X 1 , . . . , X m is shared, the following protocol realizes secure modulo summation.
Theorem 1: Protocol 1 realizes secure modulo summation.
Protocol 1 Secure Modulo Sum Protocol from Secure Modulo Zero-sum Randomness STEP 1: Player i sends the information Z i := Y i + X i to all players via broadcast public channel.
Proof: Since Reliability condition holds for the equality m i=1 Z i = m i=1 Y i , we show only Secrecy condition. Due to the symmetry, it is sufficient to show the Secrecy condition only for player 1 when m−2 players 3, . . . , m collude. The m − 2 players have variables
Since Y 2 is subject to the uniform distribution, X 3 , . . . , X m , X 1 , X 2 +Y 2 are independent of each other and subject to the uniform distribution. Hence, H(X 3 , . . . , X m ,
Indeed, when secure modulo zero-sum randomness X 1 , . . . , X m is shared, the following protocol realizes secure modulo summation. Further, the discussion in this section can be trivially extended to the case with replacement of F 2 by Z d and F q .
Protocol 2 Generation of Secure Modulo Zero-sum Randomness from Secure Modulo Summation Protocol STEP 1: Player i generates the variable Y i subject to the uniform distribution, which is independent of other variables. STEP 2: All players calculate the modulo summation m i=1 Y i by the secure modulo summation protocol. STEP 3: Player 1 set the variable
Theorem 2: Protocol 2 realizes secure modulo zero-sum randomness. Proof: Modulo zero condition follows from the relations
Independence condition holds as follows. X 2 , . . . , X m are independent of each other and subject to the uniform distribution because of their definition. Next, we focus on X 1 and m − 2 variables among X 2 , . . . , X m . As a typical case, we discuss X 1 , . . . , X m−1 . Since Y m is subject to the uniform distribution,
Y i is also subject to the uniform distribution even when Y 2 , . . . , Y m−1 are fixed to certain values. Hence, variables X 1 , . . . , X m−1 are independent of each other and subject to the uniform distribution.
Secrecy condition is shown as follows. To discuss the secrecy of X 1 , we consider the typical case when Players
To discuss the secrecy of X 2 , we consider the typical case when Players 3, . . . , m collude. Since
As another case, we consider the case when Players 1, 3, . . . , m − 1 collude. Since
III. QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR SECURE MODULO ZERO-SUM RANDOMNESS
Now, we propose a direct verifiable construction by using the GHZ state as follows. For this aim, we introduce the phase basis state. The phase basis {|z p } z∈F2 is defined as
where |x expresses the computational basis. The phase GHZ state |GHZ p := 1 √ 2 z∈F2 |z, . . . , z p is calculated as
When all the players apply the measurement on the computational basis to the system whose initial state is |GHZ p , Player i obtains the variable X i . Then, the sum of m outcomes, i.e., m i=1 X i is zero, and m−1 outcomes are subject to the uniform distribution. Hence, these outcomes satisfy the conditions of secure modulo zero-sum randomness. That is, when the initial state is guaranteed to be |GHZ p , it is guaranteed that the outcomes are secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
When the m players apply Protocol 1 to the generated secure modulo zero-sum randomness, they can realize secure modulo summation. To verify its secrecy, each player has to verify the generated secure modulo zero-sum randomness. In secure modulo summation, when we focus on Player i, we assume that m − 2 remaining players collude at most. Hence, Player i needs to verify that the colluded players has no information with respect to X i under this assumption. That is, we assume the following assumption.
(1) Player i's quantum measurement has no correlation with those of other players. (2) Remaining players are divided into two groups S 1 and S 2 . Both groups are not empty. There is no correlation between the two groups S 1 and S 2 .
Player i does not know the separation of remaining players by S 1 and S 2 . Indeed, when we trust their measurement devices, we can verify the state |GHZ p by using the two projections defined byP
where Z := x (−1) x |x x| and X := x |x + 1 x|. Here, the subscript of Z and X expresses the Hilbert space to be acted. Now, we assume that we prepare 2n + 1 copies. Then, we randomly choose n copies and apply the testP 1 . Also, we randomly choose n copies from the remaining n + 1 copies and apply the testP 2 . If these tests are passed, the 
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remaining copy can be considered to be close to the true state |GHZ p . This discussion can be extended to the case with a general finite field F q . Appendix C gives this generalization with a formal statement of this test. However, when we cannot trust their measurement devices, the above method does not work. We need to employ the method of selftesting [5] , [6] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] . The following is the protocol to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness with the verification by Player i. For this protocol, we prepare the following measurements.
for k = 0, 1.
If they have the system of 4mn+1 copies, it can be verified as Protocol 3. Here, to distinguish the real observable from the ideal observable, we denote the measured observables by ′ .
Protocol 3 Verifiable Generation of Secure Modulo Zero-Sum Randomness for Player j STEP 1: Prepare the system of 4mn + 1 copies. STEP 2: Player i randomly divides the 4mn + 1 copies into 4m + 1 groups such that the final group is composed of one copy and the remaining groups are composed of n copies. 
Here, A expresses the average of the observed values with respect to the observables inside of the bracket [ ]. If the above test is passed, Player j considers that the remaining copy is close to the phase GHZ state |GHZ p . STEP 5: Each Player k measures the final group with Z basis, and obtain the value X k for k = 1, . . . , m.
Theorem 3: Assume that players are divided into three distinct non-empty groups Player j, S 1 , and S 2 . When groups S 1 and S 2 do not collude with each other and Protocol 3 by Player j is passed, with significance level α, Player j finds that
where E describes all the information obtained by the group S 2 and c 0 is a constant dependent on c 1 and α. Theorem 4: When all players are honest and Protocol 3 by Player j is passed, with significance level α, Player j finds that the obtained distribution P X1,...Xm satisfies
where P X1,...Xm|ideal is the ideal distribution of secure modulo zero-sum randomness and c ′ 0 is a constant dependent on α and c 1 .
[Note that the significance level is the maximum passing probability when malicious Bob sends incorrect states so that the resultant state α does not satisfy Eqs. (11) and (12) .] Proof of Theorem 3: Assume that S 1 is composed of j 1 , . . . , j l . We focus on the quantum system of Player j and the quantum system of group S 1 . The latter system is spanned by the basis
It is also spanned by |z S1;p := |z j1;p · · · |z jl;p = 1 √ 2 (|0 S2 + (−1) z |1 S1 ). We define Z S1 := |0 S1 S1 0| − |1 S1 S1 1| and X S1 := |0 S1 S1 1| + |0 S1 S1 1|. Similarly, we define Z S2 and X S2 . While the measurement Z S1 can be done by the measurement Z j1 , . . . , Z jl , the measurement X S1 can be done only by the measurement X k for any k ∈ S 1 . The same observation holds for Z S2 and Z S2 . Therefore, our GHZ |GHZ p can be considered as 1 √ 2 ( z |z p |z S1;p |z S2;p ). When one measures Z S2 , obtains the outcome z, and applies the unitary X −z j , the resultant state is the Bell state 1 √ 2 ( z |z j;p |z S1;p ). When we measure X j and X S1 to the system in the state 1 √ 2 ( z |z j;p |z S1;p |z S2;p ), the measurement outcome does not depend on the measurement outcome of Z S2 . Therefore, we can consider that the measurements on the j 1 , j, m + j 1 , m + j, 2m + j 1 , 2m + j, 3m + j 1 , 3m + j-th groups can be considered as the measurement required in Proposition 5. Now, we denote the real operator on the final group by using ′′ . The real quantum system of Player j, the groups S 1 and S 2 by H j , H S1 , and H S2 .
Using Proposition 5, we can guarantee, with significance level α, that there exist constant c 2 and isometries U j : H ′′ j → H j and U S1 : H ′′ S1 → H S1 such that
U S1 X ′′ S1 U † S1 − X S1 ≤ c 2 n −1/4 , U S1 Z ′′ S1 U † S1 − Z S1 ≤ c 2 n −1/4 .
We apply the same discussion to the case with switching S 1 and S 2 . Then, we can guarantee, with significance level α, that there exists isometry U S2 :
We define two projections
P 2 := z |z j;p |z S1;p |z S2;p j;p z| S1;p z| S2;p z|
Then, we have |GHZ p p GHZ| = P 1 P 2 . Hence, for U = U j U S1 U S2 , using (16), we have
Applying Proposition 3 to P ′′ 1 and P ′′ 2 , with significance level 2α and a constant c ′ 2 , we have
for i = 1, 2. Combining (13), (14) , (15) , (18) , (19) , and (20), with significance level 4α, we have
Hence,
LetP Xj,XS 1 ,XS 2 ,E be the joint distribution when Players apply the ideal measurements U † j Z j U j , U † S1 Z S1 U S1 , and
Therefore, with significance level 4α, we have (23) . Hence, replacing α by α/4, we obtain the desired statement.
Proof of Theorem 4:
We apply Proposition 5 to the case with X i , X j , Z i , and Z j for i = j. With significance level α, we can guarantee that there exist a constant c 2 and isometries U i :
With significant level (m − 1)α, we have (24) with any i = j. Then, using the projectionsP 1 andP 2 defined in (6) and (7), we have |GHZ p p GHZ| =P 1P2 . Hence, for U = U j U S1 U S2 , using (16), we have
Applying Proposition 3 toP ′′ 1 andP ′′ 2 , with significance level 2α and a constant c ′ 2 , we have
for i = 1, 2.
Combining (24), (25) , (26) , and (27), with significance level (m + 1)α, we have
When we apply the measurement based on a POVM M = {M i } to the system whose state is ρ, we denote the output distribution by P M ρ . For any POVM M = {M i }, we have
We denote the POVM corresponding to the ideal observables Z 1 , . . . , Z m (the real observables Z ′′ 1 , . . . , Z ′′ m ) by M ideal (M real ). When we apply the measurement based on the POVM M ideal (M real ) to the system whose state is σ, we denote the output distribution by P Mideal X1,...,Xm (P Mreal X1,...,Xm ). Since
we have
Since (24) and (27) 
Replacing α by α/(m + 1), we obtain the desired statement.
IV. QUANTUM PROTOCOL FOR SECURE MODULO SUMMATION
Combining the above two methods, the following protocol realizes secure modulo summation with verification.
Protocol 4 Verifiable Quantum Secure Modulo Summation STEP 1: m players generate 4m 2 n + 1 copies of the state |GHZ p . STEP 2: Each player randomly chooses distinct 4mn copies and apply Steps 2, 3, and 4 of Protocol 3. If all the tests are passed, they proceed to the next step. STEP 3: All the players apply the measurement of the computational basis to the remaining one copy. The outcomes X 1 , . . . , X m are used as secure modulo zero-sum randomness. STEP 4: Player i sends the information Z i := Y i + X i to all players via broadcast public channel.
Due to Theorem 3, Player j can verify the secrecy of X j under the minimum non-collusion condition for j = 1, . . . , m. That is, Secrecy condition holds. Also, Theorem 4 guarantees Reliability condition. Therefore, we can consider that Protocol 4 is a verifiable quantum secure modulo summation.
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER METHODS

A. Other quantum methods for secure modulo summation
Using quantum systems, the references [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] proposed a protocol to securely calculate modulo summation, which is essentially equivalent to the generation of secure modulo zero-sum randomness. However, they did not propose a method to verify the secrecy and the correctness of their computation. In our method, instead of a direct computation of secure summation, we propose a method to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness with a protocol (Protocol 3) to verify the secrecy and the correctness.
For example, the method proposed by the paper [11] is summarized as follows. First, m − 1 players shares the GHZ state |GHZ := 1 √ q x∈F2 |x, . . . , x . Second, Player i applies Z Xi and sends the system to Player m, where Z := x∈F2 ω tr x |x x| and i runs from 1 to m − 1. Third Player m measures the total system by the basis
Finally, Player m sends the outcome to all other players. Since the quantum state used in their method is the GHZ state, it can be verified in the same way as in Section III. In this case, Player i for i = m can verify the GHZ state in the same way as Protocol 3. However, when Player m wishes to verify the secrecy of Y m , the protocol is not so simple. In this case, in the verification stage, Player m needs to ask each player to make measurements and send back the outcomes. Further, these communications need to be secret, which requires additional quantum communication. Due to this problem, our method is more efficient than the combination of the method by [11] and the verification given in Protocol 3.
B. From secure agreed random numbers
We discuss a method to generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness from secure agreed random numbers. Secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players can be generated from several pairs of secure agreed random numbers as follows. Assume that Player i and Player i + 1 share the secret random number Z i ∈ F c 2 . Also, we assume that Player m and Player 1 share the secret random number Z m ∈ F c 2 . Then, Player 1 puts the random variable X 1 := Z 1 − Z m , and Player i puts the random variable X i := Z i − Z i−1 . The resultant variables X 1 , . . . , X m satisfy the condition m i=1 X i = 0 and the independence between any n − 1 variables of them. Indeed, secure agreed random numbers can be generated by using quantum key distribution. This method generate secure modulo zero-sum randomness if all the players are honest. However, each player does not have a method to verify whether other players are honest. Therefore, even when we apply the randomness generated by this method to Protocol 1, the obtained method does not satisfy the condition of verifiable secure modulo summation However, when Player j wishes to verify the generated secure modulo zero-sum randomness, he/she needs to verify the secrecy of all the secret random numbers. In this case, these secret random numbers need to be generated by quantum communication with selftesting. When a part of the secret random number is Player j, the secrecy can be directly verified by Player j. However, when the secret random number is not shared by Player j, Player j needs to ask both players sharing the secret random number to make measurement and send the outcome to Player j. The required communication between Player j and each player should be secret, which required another quantum communication and selftesting. Therefore, we can say that our method is more efficient than the above method.
C. Asymptotically approximated generation from information theoretical assumption
Secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players can be generated from information theoretical assumption with asymptotically negligible error. A sequence of random variables X i,n ∈ F cn 2 is called secure modulo zero-sum randomness with asymptotically negligible error when D(P X1,n,...,Xm,n , PX 1,n ,...,Xm,n ) → 0
where D is the variational distance andX 1,n , . . . ,X m,n is a secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players.
Here, lim n→∞ cn n is called the generation rate. For example, secure modulo zero-sum randomness among m players can be generated with asymptotically negligible error when the multiple access channel satisfies a certain condition and they can use the multiple access channel n times. The detail construction will be given in [36] . Also, with asymptotically negligible error, it can be extracted from the n-fold independent and identical distribution of a certain joint distribution of m random variables Z 1 , . . . , Z m only with broadcast public communication when the joint distribution satisfies a certain condition [36] .
However, this method requires noisy classical channel whose noise level is known to all players. Unfortunately, there is no method to guarantee such a noisy classical channel. Therefore, this method cannot be considered as a protocol to realize verifiable secure modulo summation.
VI. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION OF HOMOMORPHIC FUNCTIONS
In the discussions in Sections VI, VII, and VIII, we assume that q is a power of 2 because the finite field F q can be regarded as an ℓ-dimensional vector space over F 2 . Hence, a c-dimensional vector space over F q can be regarded as F cℓ 2 . That is, a secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F c q with i = 1, . . . , m is defined as a secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F cℓ 2 with i = 1, . . . , m. However, the discussions in Sections VI, VII, and VIII can be extended to the case with a general finite field F q because these discussions hold by replacing F 2 with F q .
The discussion in the previous section can be extended to a homomorphic function with respect to addition. Let f : (F c q ) m → F c q be an additively homomorphic function whose value can be determined by a linear combination of inputs. That is,
where α 1 , . . . , α m are all in F c q andf : F c q → F c q is some function. For the security, we also assume that f is sensitive in the sense that the image of f distributes uniformly at random when some argument is chosen uniformly at random and the other arguments are fixed.
Protocol 5 Secure Computation for an additively homomorphic function f STEP 1: Player i computes Z i :=f (X i + α i Y i ) and distributes it to all the other players via public channel. STEP 2: Each player collects all Z 1 , . . . , Z m and computes m i=1 Z i .
The task can be realized in Protocol 5, which employs secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F c q for i = 1, . . . , m and the broadcast public channel. That is, a player sends a message via the public channel, any other users can receive the same message. The security is defined in terms of the real/ideal paradigm of the universal composability [37] , [38] . We will consider the security in the (F pub , F mzsr )-hybrid model, where F pub is a functionality of the broadcast public channel and F mzsr is a functionality of the modulo zero-sum randomness. So, it is enough to provide simple definitions (without interaction with the adversary) of the functionalities.
Functionality F pub (Simple Form)
Upon receiving (Send, sid , R, x) from Party i, F pub outputs (Sent, sid , i, R, x) to all parties in R, where sid is a session id and R is a list of receivers of a message x.
Functionality F mzsr (Simple Form)
F q,c mzsr proceeds as follows, when parameterized by the alphabet size q and the length c. Upon receiving (Request, sid ) from Party i, F q,c mzsr generates modulo zero-sum randomness X 1 , . . . , X m , each in F c 2 , satisfying the modulo zero-sum condition and the independence condition and outputs (Response, sid , i, j, X j ) to Party j for each j = 1, . . . , m. Now, we are ready to give definitions of the correctness and the privacy. Definition 1: Let f (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an m-party functionality and π be an m-party protocol. We say that the protocol is correct if honest parties do not get incorrect values in the presence of the adversary. Remark. If π is correct, then the following holds.
1) The protocol aborts whenever it detects a cheating behavior of the adversary, or 2) honest parties must get the correct values if π does not abort. Definition 2: Let f (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an m-party functionality and π be an m-party protocol. We say that the protocol τ -securely computes f with perfect privacy if there exists a simulator S for which the following holds. For any subset of corrupted parties T ⊆ {1, . . . , m} at most size τ by the adversary A and every m-tuple of inputs x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ), two probability distributions Ideal f,S (x) and Real π,A are identical.
1) Ideal f,S (x) is defined as
where y = f (x),T = {1, . . . , m}\T , and v[T ] denotes the sub-vector (v j ) j∈T for a vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v m ). This is the joint distribution of the simulated view of the corrupted parties together with outputs of the honest parties in an ideal implementation of f . 2) Real π,A is defined as (View π,T (x), Output π,T (x)),
where View π,T (x) is the joint view of the parties in T by executing π on input x and Output π,T (x) is the output that π delivers to the honest parties inT . Remark. If f is a single-valued function and the functional value is required to be shared among all the parties, then we consider that y = (y, y, . . . , y) , where y = f (x).
Theorem 5: Let f be an additively homomorphic function of the form Eq. (35) . Then, Protocol 5 is correct in the semi-honest model.
Proof: Since the adversary does not alter Z i due to the condition of broadcast public channel, each player can collect the correct values Z 1 , . . . , Z m . Then each player computes
This concludes the proof. Remark. If we allow a malicious adversary A, which can send a fake value for Z i for Party i corrupted by A. In this case, the correctness of Protocol 5 does not hold. A naive application of universal hash functions, which will be discussed in Section VII, does not work. In this paper, our concern is to demonstrate that the modulo zero-sum randomness contributes to simple cryptographic construction and thus we do not consider the correctness in the malicious model any more.
Theorem 6: Let f be an additively homomorphic function of the form Eq. (35) . Then, f can be (m − 1)-securely computed with perfect privacy by Protocol 5 in the (F pub , F mzsr )-hybrid model.
Proof: For the proof, we follow the convention in [39] . First, we assume that the adversary A collapses Players 1, . . . , m − 1. Since Protocol 5 is essentially non-interactive, what the adversary A can do is just sending a fake value Z ′ i instead of Z i for Player i. Then, Real π,A (with help of F pub and F mzsr ) is described as 
Thus, we can say that Ideal f,S is identical to Real π,A .
Next, we consider the case that A collapses Players 1, . . . , k, where k < m − 1. In this case, we can similarly construct a simulator S. The difference is that S can compute Z = Z k+1 + · · · + Z m instead of Z m . Sincef is sensitive, we can take random values from the image off for Z k+1 , . . . , Z m−1 . S can set Z m = Z − (Z k+1 + · · · + Z m−1 ). This is also a perfect simulation of Real π,A . Remark. In the statement of Theorem 6, we do not clearly mention that the corruption is static or adapive. Since Protocol 5 is essentially non-interactive, we do not distinguish static adversaries from adaptive ones.
VII. SECRET SHARING WITHOUT SECURE COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
A. Basic Protocol
While there are many secret sharing protocols, they require secure communication channel in the dealing phase [20] . Now, we propose a secret sharing protocol without use of secure communication channel. Assume that there are m players and Player 1 has a secret message Y ∈ F c q . Our task is the following without use of secure communication channel. Player m can decode the secret message Y only when all the m − 1 players except for Player 1 collaborate for the decoding. A conventional secret sharing protocol does not achieve this requirement because it employs secure communication channels in the dealing step.
When the m players have secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F c q for i = 1, . . . , m, this task can be realized as Protocol 6. 
B. Cheater Detectable Protocol
However, this protocol cannot detect whether Players 2, . . . , m − 1 send incorrect information. To resolve this problem, we propose the following protocol (Protocol 7), which employs secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F c q for i = 1, . . . , m. In this protocol, the information Y transmitted from Player 1 is a non-zero element of F q . Hence, Y is subject to the uniform distribution on F q \ {0}. When the size of information to be transmitted is large, we use algebraic extension. We identify the vector space F c q with the finite filed F q ′ with q ′ = q c by considering algebraic extension. 
Player m considers that there is no cheating and Y ′ equals the original information Y . If Y ′ does not belong to F q ⊂ F q ′ , Player m considers that there is cheating and discard Y ′ . Now, we analyze the performance of Protocol 7. First of all, we consider the security of Protocol 7 and the success probability of the reconstruction of Protocol 7 when all the players are honest.
Proposition 1: Suppose that all the players are honest in Protocol 7. Then, Protocol 7 has the perfect secrecy and the success probability of the reconstruction is 1 − q −c .
Proof: If X 1 = 0 then Z = 0. In this case, Y ′ = 0. This is different from Y , which is non-zero. If X 1 = 0 then Y ′ = Y and the reconstruction succeeds. Since the probability that X 1 = 0 is q −c , the success probability is 1 − q −c . For the security, we assume that Players 2, . . . , m collude to get X 2 + · · · + X m−1 . If X 1 = 0 then Z = 0. Z does not include any information on Y . If X 1 = 0 then Z looks random. What they can do for guessing X 1 is just a random choice. This implies that X m also looks random. Since Y = Y ′ = −Z( m i=2 X i ) −1 and both its numerator and denominator are non-zero, what they can do for guessing Y is also a random choice. Thus, Protocol 7 has the perfect secrecy.
If Players 2, . . . , m − 1 use the information in the dealing phase, these players can make a cheat. Hence, it is essential to put the transmission of the random variables X 2 , . . . , X m−1 before the dealing phase. As an attack, we assume that at least one of Players 2, . . . , m − 1 makes Player m to decode a different information from Y that belongs to F q . We call this attack the modification attack. For simplicity, we consider the case when all of Players 2, . . . , m − 1 collude for the modification attack.
Theorem 7: When all of Players 2, . . . , m − 1 in Protocol 7 collude for the modification attack, they succeed the attack with probability q−1 q ′ −1 .
Proof: When X 1 = 0, to succeed this attack, the sum V ′ of variables sent from Players 2, . . . , m−1 to m needs to satisfy the condition −X −1 1 (V ′ +X m ) ∈ F q \{1}. When we denote the sum m−1 i=2 X i by V , the above condition is equivalent to the following condition. There exists an element A( = 1) ∈ F q such that V ′ − V − X 1 = −AX 1 , i.e., V ′ = V + (1 − A)X 1 . Since X 1 is subject to the uniform distribution on F q ′ \ {0}, the variable (1 − A)X 1 is subject to the uniform distribution on F q ′ \ {0}. Since the number of A( = 1) ∈ F q is q − 1, the probability to satisfy the condition required to V ′ is q−1 q ′ −1 . Remark. Regardless of the modification attack (in the setting of Theorem 7), Protocol 7 maintains the perfect secrecy as discussed in the proof of Proposition 1.
Indeed, there exist so many secret sharing protocols with dishonest players. Some of them can identify the cheating players [21] , [22] , [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] . However, all the existing protocols require secure communication channels in the dealing phase. The advantage of this protocol is unnecessity of secure communication channels due to use of secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
VIII. MULTI-PARTY ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION
A. Basic Protocol
Suppose that a certain project written as the variable Y ∈ F d q requires the approvals from all of m players. Our requirement is the following. We verify that all m players approve the project by confirming the contents Y . Additionally, we require anonymity for this approval.
We consider the following naive protocol by using secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F c q for i = 1, . . . , m. If Player i agrees on the project, he/she sends his/her random variable X i to the other players via broadcast public channel. Otherwise, he/she sends another variable to the other players via broadcast public channel. Then, each player calculates the sum of the received variables and his/her own variable. If the sum is zero, the project can be considered to be approved.
However, this protocol has the following problem. There is a possibility that Player i incorrectly receives a different information Y ′ from Y as the project. This case is called a mismatched recognition. In fact, when the secrecy of the information Y is required, it might be distributed via secure communication channel priorly. This assumption is natural because it is usual to require the secrecy of the contents of the project. Hence, we need to be careful about a mismatched recognition. That is, we need to verify that each player makes the decision based on the correct information Y .
To prevent a mismatched recognition, as illustrated in Fig. 1 , attaching the message authentication protocol [40] , [41] to information Y , we propose the following protocol as Protocol 8. As a preparation of Protocol 8, from secure modulo zero-sum randomness X i ∈ F c q for i = 1, . . . , m, we generate an e × d Toeplitz matrix T i and a variable A i ∈ F e q , where we choose the integers e and d to satisfy 2e + d − 1 = c. (Note that Toeplitz matrices can be used universal hash functions. You may consult with a textbook [42] .) Indeed, since an e × d Toeplitz matrix T i needs e + d − 1 elements of F q , the pair of T i and A i requires 2e + d − 1 = c elements of F q . In the following, we also assume that the variable Y ∈ F d q describing the project has been distributed to all the players priorly while there is a possibility of a mismatched recognition.
Protocol 8 Multi-party Anonymous Authentication STEP 1: [Voting] Player i sends B i ∈ F e q to the remaining players via broadcast public channel. If Player i agrees on the project described by Y , he/she chooses B i as T i Y + A i . Otherwise, he/she chooses B i subject to the uniform distribution on F e q . STEP 2: [Verification] Each player calculates n i=1 B i . If the sum is zero, the project can be considered to be approved.
B. Analysis with honest players
When all the players send T i Y + A i based on the same variable Y , we have
A i ) = 0Y + 0 = 0 and all the players find that all of them approve the project written by Y . Hence, for security analysis, we need the analysis on the case when at least one player disagrees on the project and/or at least one player recognizes a different information from Y . For this aim, we have the following two theorems.
Theorem 8: When at least one Player i ′ disagrees on the project, the probability of n i=1 B i = 0 is q −e . Proof: Since B i ′ is subject to the uniform distribution on F e q , the probability of n i=1 B i = 0 is q −e . Theorem 9: When all the players agree on the project and at least one Player i recognizes the information Y i that is different from the information Y 1 recognized by Player 1, the probability of n i=1 B i = 0 is q −e . This theorem ensures that if the project is approved by this protocol, all the players confirm no mismatched recognition.
Proof: Assume that players i 1 , . . . , i k recognize the information Y i1 , . . . , Y ik that is different from the information Y 1 recognized by Player 1. Also assume that other players recognize the same information Y 1 recognized by Player 1. We define the variable V ij := Y ij − Y 1 for j = 1, . . . , k. Then, we have
Since V i,j = 0, the variable T ij V i,j is independently subject to the uniform distribution on F e q . Hence, k j=1 T ij V i,j is also subject to the uniform distribution on F e q . Therefore, we obtain the desired statement.
C. Analysis with malicious player
Now, we consider the case with a malicious player. When malicious Player j makes rushing, Player i can realize the situation n i=1 B i = 0 by sending − i =j B i unless all the players do not approve the same variable Y . Hence, when we employ Protocol 8, we need to trust all the players. To avoid the rushing attack, we propose another protocol (Protocol 9), which trusts Player 1. 
If it is zero, the project can be considered to be approved. STEP 3: [Notification] Player 1 sends the above result to other players. Now, we consider the following type of malicious player. Assume that malicious Players l, . . . , m want to make the following situation by colluding together. Here, for the notational convenience, we assume that Players l, . . . , m are malicious. Players 1, . . . , l − 1 consider that the project is described by another information Y 1 , . . . , Y l−1 , and they approve this project based on this incorrect information. Then, Player 1 announces that all the players approve the project based on the same information while they are not the same. For this kind of attack, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10: In Protocol 9, malicious Players l, . . . , m succeed the above attack with probability q −e . Proof: To realize this situation,
We define the set {i 1 , . . . ,
are independently subject to the uniform distribution on F e q . Since A i is subject to the uniform distribution on F e q for i = 2, . . . , l − 1, B i is independent of T i Y i . Hence, Players l, . . . , m cannot obtain any information T i Y i from B i for 2, . . . , l − 1. Thus, letting
we obtain
Since
is subject to the uniform distribution, Players l, . . . , m can make the situation n i=1 B i = 0 with probability q −e .
IX. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new concept of secure modulo sum randomness and a quantum protocol to generate it. We also have constructed its verification protocol that works even with untrusted measurement devices. Then, combining them, we have proposed a verifiable quantum protocol for secure modulo summation for m players even with untrusted measurement devices. This protocol guarantees secrecy for each player even when m − 2 players collude at most. However, since we employ selftesting, our method works only with F 2 . In order to extend our method to the case with a general finite field F q , we need to develop selftesting in q-dimensional system with operators X and Z. This is an interesting future study.
Proposition 2:
With significance level α, we have For any constants c 1 , p * and α, there exists a constant c 2 such that with significance level α, we have
When p * is zero, we prepare a different type of evaluation as follows. Proposition 3: With significance level α ≥ k+1 n+1 , we have
That is, for any constants c 1 and α, there exists a constant c 2 such that with significance level α, we have
Proof: We denote the number of 1 among X 1 , . . . , X n+1 by the variable X. We assume that P (X = x) = P x . Then, we have
That is,
Thus, we have
and
The condition (1 − p) + p k+1 n+1 ≥ α is equivalent to the condition 1 − α ≥ p(1 − k+1 n+1 ) = p n−k n+1 , which is rewritten as (1 − α) n+1 n−k ≥ p. Under this condition, we have 
Combining (47) and (48), we obtain the desired statement.
APPENDIX B SELFTESTING OF BELL SATE
To discuss the verification of the GHZ state, we review the existing result for selftesting of the Bell state by [17] . To fit our use, we consider the case when the Bell state is given as 1 where |x expresses the computational basis, ω := exp 2πi p and tr y for y ∈ F q is TrM y where M y denotes the multiplication map x → yx with the identificiation of the finite field F q with the vector space F t p . Then, the phase GHZ state |GHZ p := 1 √ q z∈Fq |z, . . . , z p is calculated as |GHZ p = 1 q m−1 x1,...,xm∈Fq:x1+...+xm=0 |x 1 , . . . , x m .
When all the players apply measurement on the computational basis and the initial state is |GHZ p , the sum of m outcomes is zero and m − 1 outcomes are subject to the uniform distribution. Hence, these outcomes satisfy the conditions of secure modulo zero-sum randomness. That is, when the initial state is guaranteed to be |GHZ p , it is guaranteed that the outcomes are secure modulo zero-sum randomness. When we trust measurement devices, we can employ the following protocol to verify the state |GHZ p .
Protocol 11 Verifiable Generation of Secure Modulo Zero-Sum Randomness STEP 1: [Phase basis check] They prepare the system of 2n + 1 copies. They randomly choose n copies, and apply the measurement of the phase basis. If their outcomes are the same, the test is passed. STEP 2: [Computational basis check] They randomly choose n copies, and apply the measurement of the computational basis. If the modulo sums of their outcomes are zero, the test is passed. STEP 3: [Generation] They apply the measurement of the computational basis to the remaining one copy. The outcomes are used as secure modulo zero-sum randomness.
Theorem 11: Assume that α > 1 2n+1 in Protocol 11. If the test is passed, with significance level α, we can guarantee that the resultant state σ on each remaining system satisfies Trσ|GHZ p p GHZ| ≥ 1 − 1 α(2n + 1)
.
[Note that the significance level is the maximum passing probability when malicious Bob sends incorrect states so that the resultant state α does not satisfy Eq. (58).] The proof of the theorem is given below. From the theorem and the relation between the fidelity and trace norm [40] [(6.106)], we can conclude the verifiability: if they passed the test, they can guarantee that σ − |GHZ p p GHZ| 1 ≤ 1 α(2n + 1)
with significance level α. Therefore, when P ideal is the ideal distribution of secure modulo zero-sum randomness and P real is the real distribution obtained via the measurement with respect to the computation basis, we have P real − P ideal 1 ≤ 1 α(2n + 1)
Proof: We choose a new coordinatex 1 , . . . ,x m asx 1 = x 1 +. . .+x m andx i = x i for i = 2, . . . , m. We denote the unitary corresponding to this coordinate conversion by U . When a matrix D is applied in the computation basis, the conversion on phase basis is given by (D −1 ) T . Since
we have U |GHZ p = |0 |0, . . . , 0 p .
We denote the projection to U † I ⊗ |0, . . . , 0 p p 0, . . . , 0|U and U † |0 0| ⊗ I ⊗m−1 U byP 1 andP 2 , respectively. Then, we find thatP 1P2 = |GHZ p p GHZ|.
Also, we find thatP 1 andP 2 are the projections to the subspaces accepting the phase basis check and the computational basis check, respectively. We randomly choose one remaining system. Let A be the random permutation ofP ⊗n 1 ⊗P ⊗n 2 ⊗(I−|GHZ p p GHZ|), which expresses the event that they accept the test and the state on the remaining system is orthogonal to the state |GHZ p p GHZ|. We define the projectionP i :=P i −P 0 , whereP 0 := |GHZ p p GHZ| for i = 1, 2. Also, we define the projectionP 3 := I − |GHZ p p GHZ|−P 1 −P 2 . Then, we have 4 orthogonal projectionsP 0 ,P 1 ,P 2 ,P 3 .
Then, we have A = v∈{0,1,2,3} 2n 1 +1
whereP v , C 1 (v), and C 2 (v) are defined by using the number N i (v) of i in v as P v :=P v1 ⊗ · · · ⊗P v2n 1 +1 (65)
, v ′ is given as a permutation of v .
Then, we find that the maximum eigenvalue of A is 1 2n+1 1 . Since we have A ≤ 1 2n+1 , any initial state ρ satisfies TrρA ≤ 1 2n+1 . Now, we assume that the probability accepting the test is less than α. Then, under the condition that they accept the test, the probability of the event orthogonal to the state |GHZ p p GHZ| is upper bounded by 1 α · 1 2n+1 . Hence, we obtain the desired statement.
